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Comment Letter on April 2001 Exposure Draft - Independence 
 
 
The staff of the Independence Standards Board appreciates the 
opportunity to comment on your April 2001 Exposure Draft.  The 
Board of the ISB has not considered these matters and reaches 
conclusions only after extensive due process and deliberation.  
Consequently, the comments below reflect the staff’s views and 
should not be attributed to the Board or to any Board member. 
 
We congratulate the Ethics Committee for an excellent document 
and are very pleased to see the continuing convergence of our views 
with yours.  We intend, for example, to recommend to our Board a 
revised definition of independence in our conceptual framework 
document that is quite similar to the one included in your ED. 
 
Our comments on specific matters follow: 
 
Impair vs. Compromise 
 
A dictionary definition of impair is “to make worse.”  In connection 
with our conceptual framework project we concluded that using the 
word impair as you do in paragraph 8.8 (“influences that impair 
professional judgment”) could be misinterpreted. Therefore we use 
the word “compromise” and explain the difference as follows:  “An 
auditor’s objectivity is ‘impaired’ if it is negatively affected to any 
degree; objectivity is ‘compromised’ if the impairment rises to the 
level of precluding unbiased audit decisions.” 
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Audit client  
 
 
- We believe the definition regarding related parties should apply to private 






- In describing independence of mind the ED uses the term “impair professional 
judgment,” whereas for independence in appearance the ED says “unacceptably 
impaired.”  Do the terms mean the same thing? 
 
- We suggest that independence in appearance be defined as the third party 
concluding that the firm or auditor lacks independence of mind to show the linkage 
between the two concepts. 
 
- It would be helpful if the document provided guidance to auditors and others on 
how they should assess whether “a reasonable and informed third party…would 










- We believe that other “independence decision makers,” such as audit committees 
and management, should and will also use the document to assess auditor 
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- We recognize the necessity for the “unless they are prohibited from complying” 
language.  We believe, however, that the audit firm still should be required to make 
an assessment as to whether in such situations its independence would be 
compromised or would appear to others to be compromised.  If the firm concludes 
its independence would be compromised, then the firm should decline the 
engagement even if the reason for the compromised independence is compliance 




- We would make a distinction between immediate family members and close family 
members.  We would prohibit any employment of immediate family members of 
those on the engagement because the self-interest and familiarity threats arising 
from such employment, because of either financial or emotional ties, are too great 
to be overcome by any safeguard other than removal.  We also believe that in the 
vast majority of cases such a requirement would not involve any significant cost 
because others could replace any affected professionals. 
 
Paragraph 8.35 (d) 
 
- We suggest that the examples of safeguards within the assurance client include the 
appropriate “tone at the top” – clear and regular messages from the audit committee 





- We suggest specific acknowledgement that compensation and promotion policies 
which reward quality audits and professionalism play an important role in 





- If there are situations where the new requirements are more stringent than existing 
ones, you might consider “grandfathering” those relationships that are acceptable 
currently.  This in our judgment would be reasonable and would permit an earlier 
effective date because existing relationships would not have to be unwound. Under 
such circumstances, we would suggest an effective date – for new relationships – 




- In cases where the disposal period is long (say more than thirty days), even if the 
disposal is at “the earliest practical date,” we believe the self-interest threat is too 
great to be mitigated by any safeguards.  We also believe such financial interests 
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would fail an appearance test. The affected professional should be prohibited from 




- We repeat the comment above regarding “earliest practical date.”  On the other 
hand, we believe that materiality should be measured against the net worth of both 
the relative and the audit professional.  As we said in our letter of August 14, 2000, 
we do not believe an investment by, for example, an adult child of the auditor that is 
material to the child but trivial in relation to the net worth of the auditor would 




- We understand that service as a trustee (at least in United States) creates fiduciary 
responsibilities to the trust.  Such responsibilities would, in our judgment, 
compromise the auditor’s independence even it the auditor is not a beneficiary or 
the interest is not material to the trust.   Furthermore, even if there is no significant 
influence over investment decisions, knowledge of the investment by the auditor 
combined with the fiduciary responsibility as trustee could have a compromising 




- We agree, except that we would also prohibit joint negotiations for a financial 




- We do not believe that allowing audit client loans to the audit firm or to a member 
of the assurance team satisfies a cost-benefit analysis.  Although one could argue 
that an immaterial loan from an audit client would not jeopardize the auditor’s 
independence, we believe that even immaterial loans are bound to raise questions 
about favorable terms and the appropriateness of the relationship between auditor 
and client. 
 
- The document states, in paragraphs 8.114 and 8.115, that the loan or deposit  
“would not create a threat to independence.” Similar language is used in other 
paragraphs.  In addition to disagreeing with the conclusions, as discussed above, we 
believe it may be more accurate to acknowledge that there is a threat but that in 
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- We do not believe the audit firm or member of the assurance team should be 
making, holding or guaranteeing any loans by or to an audit client, regardless of 
materiality.  We believe the very act of engaging in the transaction, or monitoring 




- An interest in a closely held entity normally involves negotiations directly with the 
entity or another shareholder of the entity, as contrasted with the impersonal process 
of buying stock in a traded company.  Furthermore, by definition, the number of 
shareholders in a closely held entity is small, and the opportunity – and in some 
cases the need – for contacts between and among shareholders is high.  
Consequently, we believe the familiarity and self-interest threats, as well as the 
appearance concern, are too strong to permit the firm or a professional on the 
engagement to have any interests in a closely-held entity along with the client or a 




- In addition to the safeguards described, there should be assessment of the 
relationship between remaining members of the audit team and the former 
professional now in a responsible position at the client.  The purpose would be to 
replace those team members whose objectivity might be compromised by their 




- We agree with the conclusions in these paragraphs except we do not believe it is 









- We do not believe that requiring management to make the decisions on employment 
of senior managers of the company can mitigate the threats identified in this 
paragraph.  The process of interviewing candidates and identifying those who 
should be referred to the client represent important decisions which should not be 
delegated to the audit firm.  On the other hand, we believe it is acceptable and 
reasonable for members of the assurance team – or others from the audit firm - to 
interview candidates previously selected by the company.  
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- We believe there are situations when the size of the fees relative to the firm, or a 
subset of the firm, depending on how it is organized, are so material that the only 
safeguard is to decline the engagement. In other cases discussion of the situation 
with the audit committee might be appropriate.  We have proposed a project on that 




- We do not agree that disclosure of unpaid fees in the financial statements or 
assurance report is an effective safeguard.  Readers will not know how to evaluate 
the information.  There may, however, be cases where the past due unpaid fee is so 
large that it creates a self-interest threat that can only be resolved by declining to 





- We believe there should be a presumption that actual or threatened litigation by the 
client involving the audit should require the auditor to withdraw.  The other 
safeguards described are unlikely to mitigate the threats created by such a lawsuit.  
We also believe that declining to continue to serve as the auditor should be required 
when there is any other litigation between the firm and the client that is either 
material to either party or raises questions about the client’s integrity or willingness 




- There is no guidance regarding investment companies, including independence 
requirements relating to the investment advisor and other investment companies in 
the same group.  The rules issued recently by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission include such guidance, based generally on ISB Standard No. 2, and we 
encourage you to include such guidance in your pronouncement. 
 
- There is also no guidance regarding what in the United States are known as 
alternative practice structures.  This would include formal and informal affiliations 
with auditing firms in other countries or cities, or with providers of other services.  
A fuller discussion of the arrangements and independence issues can be found in 
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We would be pleased to discuss our comments with you at your convenience. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Arthur Siegel 
Executive Director 
